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G. E. M. Anscombe famously remarked that an adequate philosophy of psychology was
needed before we could do ethics. Fifty years have passed, and we should now ask what
signiﬁcance our best theories of the psychology of agency have for moral philosophy.
My focus is on non-moral conceptions of autonomy and self-governance that
emphasize the limits of deliberation – the way in which one’s cares render certain
options unthinkable, one’s intentions and policies ﬁlter out what is inconsistent with
them, and one’s resolutions function to block further reﬂection. I argue that we can
expect this deliberative “silencing” to lead to moral failures that occur because the
morally correct option was ﬁltered out of the agent’s deliberation. I think it follows
from these conceptions of self-governance that we should be considered culpable for
unwitting acts and omissions, even if they express no ill will, moral indifference, or
blameworthy evaluative judgments. The question is whether this consequence is
acceptable. Either way, the potential tradeoff between self-governance and moral
attentiveness is a source of doubt about recent attempts to ground the normativity of
rationality in our concern for self-governance.
Keywords: agency; responsibility; omissions; deliberation
Grahm felt increasingly frustrated. Voices in his mind told him to do something, but he had no
ideas. Like most of his neighbors he had devoted his life to farming. He liked farming. All he
wanted to do was farm. Farmers had a long, proud history of avoiding social, economic, and
political issues. They enjoyed nature, work, and solitude, and they eschewed everything that
might be considered grist for the nightly news. (David Rhodes, Driftless, 2008)
There is a signiﬁcant strand of contemporary philosophy of action that has taken to heart
Anscombe’s (1958) proclamation in “Modern Moral Philosophy”: that before we can proﬁt-
ably do moral philosophy, an adequate philosophy of psychology is needed. According to
these conceptions of action theory, the ultimate goal is to give an account of “full-blooded
agency,” or agency “par excellence,” which distinguishes between what merely happens to
a person and what she does. A successful theory will be one that explains what “plays the
role of the agent,” as J. David Velleman (1992) puts it, or elucidates “the structure of a
person’s will,” as Harry Frankfurt (1988) says, such that when this structure guides behav-
ior, “the agent governs himself,” in Michael Bratman’s (2013) words. In other words, they
are theories of autonomy.
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According to Kantian approaches to autonomy, to give a theory of self-governance is at
the same time to be engaged in doing moral philosophy. A Kantian agent is not fully auton-
omous unless he acts on maxims that satisfy the Categorical Imperative, and thus in confor-
mity with and out of respect for the moral law. In contrast, the approaches to autonomy
mentioned above deny that it is attainable only by those whose will is, or is aiming to be,
morally good. These non-moral conceptions of autonomy allow that a perfectly self-govern-
ing Iago or Caligula is possible, in that the authority with which a given psychological struc-
ture speaks for the agent does not intrinsically depend upon a concern for moral reasons.
Rather, the insight – the deep and important insight, in my view – is that there is an essential
feature of agency par excellence that is shared by the sinner and the saint.
There is a second respect in which these contemporary accounts of autonomy differ
from Kant’s, and could perhaps be said to be more Aristotelian instead. This is in recogniz-
ing limits on the role reﬂective deliberation can or should play in responding to our reasons.
On somewhat different grounds, Frankfurt, Bratman, and Richard Holton each claim that
the autonomous agent will not consider in deliberation many courses of action which are
in fact available to her. Indeed, the agent would be wrong to do so; to use John McDowell’s
apt term, certain potential options should be “silenced” for her (1979). On these views, the
psychological structure that plays the role of the agent functions in part to ﬁlter out certain
courses of action as inconsistent with one’s plans, threatening to one’s long-term goals, and
at the limit, in conﬂict with one’s entire practical identity. An essential aspect of self-gov-
ernance is thus being such as not to have one deliberative thought too many.
My interest here is to ask, decades after Anscombe’s prescription, what implications these
morally neutral conceptions of autonomous agency have for ethics. In particular, what can we
learn about the conditions of moral responsibility from our best current understanding of the
psychology of self-governed action? I will argue that the proposed relationship between
autonomy and deliberative silencing constitutes a pressure point for our thinking about
agency and responsibility, forcing us to address the question of whether being autonomous
is sufﬁcient for being appropriately subject to blame, praise, and guilt. If we accept that it
is (and I believe it is difﬁcult to deny), then I will argue that these conceptions of autonomy
have the consequence that we should be considered culpable for unwitting failures – things it
simply never crossed one’s mind that one ought to do, or ought not to do. Moreover, we
should be considered culpable even when our failure to consider the morally correct
option cannot be attributed to some prior choice of which it was reasonably foreseeable
that such oversights would result. This verdict conﬂicts with a widespread assumption in
moral philosophy that non-culpable ignorance is a general moral excuse (e.g. Rosen 2003).
Some may therefore take this implication of contemporary action theory to be grounds to
reject the theory, or the seemingly obvious connection between full-blooded agency and
responsibility. Others may take it to be an illuminating result of following Anscombe’s
advice to do action theory before ethics. In either case, it will stand as a reminder that
good intentions will not sufﬁce to avoid the road to hell.
1. Control and the searchlight of conscious awareness
It is a bedrock principle of most theories of responsibility that ignorance is sometimes a
moral excuse. This principle is traceable at least to Aristotle, who observed that pardon
is bestowed on actions that are involuntary, and that “Those things, then, are thought invo-
luntary, which take place under compulsion or owing to ignorance” (Nicomachean Ethics,
Book III). The claim is not that we are never culpable for what we do as a result of ignor-
ance; we do sometimes take an agent’s ignorance of what she is doing, or failing to do, to be
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culpable in its own right. If her ignorance is a result of being reckless or negligent in her
obligations to be aware of morally relevant considerations, then she may be considered
blameworthy for consequences that are themselves brought about unawares. A classic
example is ignorance that is the result of a prior choice to become intoxicated, from
which the likelihood of future negligence was reasonably foreseeable. But barring a viola-
tion on the basis of which the agent can be held responsible for her ignorance, the common
thought is that we are not responsible for those features of our acts or omissions of which we
were at no point aware. As Michael Zimmerman puts the claim, “all culpability can be
traced to culpability that involves lack of ignorance” (1997, 418).
Deep questions immediately arise concerning what ignorance is, in the sense that bears on
moral excuses. My interest here is in a particular understanding of ignorance that is connected
to deliberation and choice, though I do not intend to suggest that this understanding is exhaus-
tive of what is morally important about ignorance. On this conception of ignorance, which we
might call “practical ignorance,” the crucial distinction turns on what is accessible to con-
scious awareness, and thus poised to play a role in determining what the agent intentionally
does. An agent might be practically ignorant of some consideration even if she subcon-
sciously “knows” it to be true, if that consideration is not consciously accessible and thus
unable to inﬂuence person-level deliberation. This type of ignorance can prevent an agent
from having knowledge of the fact that a particular act or omission is a violation of some
moral requirement even if she does not in general lack moral knowledge. The concept of prac-
tical ignorance enables us to formulate a more speciﬁc thesis concerning ignorance as a moral
excuse: that conscious awareness at some point in time of at least some of the morally relevant
features of an action or omission, or risk thereof, is required for moral responsibility. Follow-
ing George Sher, I will call this thesis the “Searchlight View” (2009).
The Searchlight View is widely assumed, though not often explicitly defended, and is
highly attractive for at least two reasons. The ﬁrst is its apparent connection to what
Thomas Nagel (1979) has labeled the Control Condition on moral responsibility: that one
should not be morally assessed for what is due to factors beyond one’s control. It is not a
conceptual truth that being in control of some factor requires being consciously aware of
that factor, but it is almost irresistible to think that the two are closely related. For
example, Neil Levy takes as a premise in defending the Searchlight View that control
requires knowing what one is doing, for “If I do not know either that I cause such
changes [in the state of affairs], or how I alter the state of affairs, then I do not control it”
(2005, 5, emphasis in original). The thought seems to be that merely being in a position
to cause some outcome is not sufﬁcient for being in control of it; rather, one must be in a
position to cause or refrain from causing it intentionally. And the paradigmatic case of inten-
tionally bringing about or allowing the occurrence of some state of affairs requires awareness
of what one is doing: the agent must know what it is she aims to bring about. This suggests
that an agent who lacks awareness that her action or omission has some morally relevant
property P does not control whether she does something with property P, and therefore
should not be morally accountable in that respect.
These reﬂections on the nature of control lead to the second reason the Searchlight
View is attractive, which is its perceived connection to the expression of the will. The
notion of the will can seem occult, but a relatively benign way to understand “willing”
includes (though is perhaps not limited to) the making of a conscious decision. When
we make a decision about what to do in the awareness that it will have a particular
result, or that other alternatives are available, we effectively accept the anticipated
results; they are included in the choice either as goal or foreseen side effect.1 But in
the absence of such awareness, the thought is that the will is not active either in choosing
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or accepting that result. If willings are the proper object of moral assessment, the Search-
light View serves to capture a constraint on what it is to express the will through the
making of a conscious choice.
Advances in social psychology and neuroscience have lately inspired challenges to the
existence of the conscious will. The worry is that the phenomenology of conscious willing
is an illusion: that actions are often initiated unconsciously and carried out automatically
or guided by our implicit biases, that our situation rather than our character often explains
what we do, and so forth (Wegner 2002; Bargh 2007; Bear and Bloom 2016). Part of my
aim here is to raise a challenge to the importance of conscious agential control that side-
steps the need to argue on grounds of empirical research. I think it is our best philosophi-
cal theories of agency, rather than our best psychological experiments, that cast doubt on
the Searchlight View.
2. Deliberation and the unthinkable
Whether or not particular acts of will essentially involve conscious awareness, a central
insight of the work of Frankfurt, Bratman, and Holton is that autonomous self-governance
over time is not merely a matter of a series of willings. On these views, to be self-governing
is for one’s psychology to have a certain structure, such that when this structure functions
properly to guide thought and action, the agent governs. And although these views differ
with respect to the details of this psychological structure, they agree that autonomy consists
partly in being disposed such that some practical considerations never cross one’s mind
during deliberation. This is made fully explicit only by Holton, but I believe it follows
also from the other two accounts if combined with a plausible view of the relationship
between propositional attitudes and occurrent mental events.
The notion of the “unthinkable” is originally owed to BernardWilliams, but is developed
by Frankfurt in a series of important papers exploring the relationship between personhood
and the limits of the will (1988, 1998). His well-known claim is that having restrictions on
one’s choices, far from threatening one’s freedom, is in fact crucial for one’s identity. If all
choices are on the table, he suggests, we become disoriented and uncertain, and the will is
impaired. An autonomous will requires limitation in the form of volitional necessities stem-
ming from what we care about and identify with. These volitional anchors render certain
actions unthinkable for a person and thereby deﬁne the boundary of who she is.
Frankfurt generally does not intend for this term to be taken literally; the unthinkability
he has in mind is most centrally an un-willability. Even if the agent does explicitly consider
the option of, say, disowning his child, he will not be able to bring himself to do it. But it is a
short step to suppose that sometimes, the structure of one’s will imposes limits on delibera-
tion by preventing the idea from even crossing one’s mind. Frankfurt appeals at times to
Bernard Williams’s famous slogan “one thought too many” to describe the effect of
caring, even surpassing Williams in arguing that when one’s wife is drowning, “the strictly
correct number of thoughts for [the husband] is zero” (2006, 36). That is, the husband
should be able to act directly on his reason to save his wife without entertaining any
thought or deliberative question whatever. Similarly, he claims that for the person who
loves living, “[s]uspending his eagerness to live while wondering whether he has any
other reason to go on would strike him as a clear case of having one thought too many”
(1998, 172). For Frankfurt, then, the process of becoming an autonomous person capable
of full-blooded action will involve the silencing of certain considerations or options in
deliberation – the very structure that constitutes her identity will dispose her not even to
think of these options as available.
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Bratman’s approach accords a central role to plans and policies rather than caring, but it
has similar implications for conscious deliberation. On his view, the psychological structure
whose guidance constitutes the agent’s governance consists of a network of plan-states, and
especially of higher-order self-governing plans concerning which considerations to treat as
reason-giving in deliberation (1987, 2007). Plans are intentions “writ large,” where inten-
tions are understood as sui generis mental states on par with but not reducible to belief and
desire. The key point here is that part of the functional role of intention on Bratman’s view is
to constrain deliberation to a tractably narrow set of options. Because we are creatures with
ﬁnite cognitive capacities and limited time and opportunity for deliberation, we have prac-
tical need of such deliberative constraints; we would be paralyzed if we attempted to con-
sider all of the practical options and arrive at a conclusion about what is best, full stop.
Intentions therefore facilitate deliberation by providing a “ﬁlter of admissibility” for
options (1987, 33). They also enable future planning by serving as stable anchors over
time, tending to resist reconsideration in the absence of good reason to think one has
made a mistake.
Like Frankfurt, Bratman is not speciﬁcally making a point about the thoughts that will
be occurrent in deliberation. An intention will generate default pressure against treating an
option as admissible even if that option does occur to the agent. But again, I think it will be a
straightforward implication of his view that sometimes, the very plan structures that ground
self-governance will cause the agent not even to consider that an option is available to her.
Intentions could not play their functional role of streamlining deliberation and resisting
reconsideration if the options that have been ruled in and out continue to be rehearsed in
deliberation. An agent who is governed by a network of plans and policies will be disposed
not even to think about options that conﬂict with those policies. In other words, a Bratma-
nian agent too is one whose structures of self-governance serve to prevent having one
thought too many.
I suspect that this point sometimes goes unappreciated out of a tendency to idealize what
deliberation is, conﬂating it with decision theory.2 Even the most thorough episode of actual
deliberation is not a matter of consulting one’s entire repository of beliefs and desires and
assigning expected utility to all available options. Human deliberation is far more con-
strained than this, and plausibly does not directly involve propositional attitudes at all.
Rather, when I deliberate about what to do, a limited range of options occurs to me, and I
decide between them (usually) by making judgments about the true and the good. These
occurrent judgments are normally caused by my beliefs and desires, but they will not be a
perfect reﬂection; some of my beliefs and desires will be left out, and my judgments will
sometimes fail to accord with what I truly believe and desire. Once we recognize the distinc-
tion between propositional attitudes, which are diachronic and heavily dispositional states,
and occurrent judgments, which are dated mental events, it is natural to understand the atti-
tude of intention as a state that functions in part to constrain the occurrent thoughts we are
disposed to undergo in deliberation.3 If I have a standing policy of never taking the elevator,
this will dispose me (particularly as time passes) not even to think of the possibility.
Holton (2009) insightfully emphasizes that certain types of intentions he terms “resol-
utions” are explicitly designed to function in this way, serving primarily to prevent certain
practical options from presenting themselves in conscious thought. In addition to their role
in streamlining deliberation, Holton accentuates the way in which intentions can enable us
to overcome temporary shifts in our preferences and evaluative judgments due to tempta-
tion. On his view, a resolution in favor of a particular course of action succeeds in being
stable in the face of the temptation to abandon that plan in part by inducing resistance in
the moment to any direct thought of how one’s reasons stand, akin to the way that
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Jesuits attempt to resist thoughts of sin (124). Holton is not as directly concerned with
giving an account of agential autonomy as Bratman or Frankfurt, and so may not seem
to belong in the target group. But in fact, the very possibility of identifying an event as
the “overcoming of temptation” depends upon supposing that the temptation-driven
desire lacks agential authority while the overcoming-mechanism has it. Holton is therefore
committed to viewing resolutions as wielding agential authority, and in this aspect his view
is similar to Bratman’s.
The general point is that on these conceptions of autonomy, agency par excellence is not
merely a matter of controlling overt behavior. It will be part of the proper functioning of this
network of intentions, resolutions, policies, and cares that certain considerations are simply
silenced for the agent, such that they will tend not even to cross her mind when she is delib-
erating about what to do. And it is important to emphasize that it is no artifact of the
approach that agential guidance is not limited to those things of which we are consciously
aware. It is an explicit aim of these theories to avoid the temptation of explaining agency by
positing a “homunculus” in the head that does the guiding, and the most tempting homun-
culus of all is consciousness. It can seem irresistible to suppose that I actively determine for
myself only those things that I am aware of, or would become aware of if I attended to them.
These theories of agency aim to avoid this mistake, holding that we are sometimes most
active with respect to what we do not even consciously consider.
3. Unwitting culpability
The question now arises of what this means for our thinking about moral responsibility, in
the sense of being appropriately subject to praise, blame, and guilt. What should we make of
cases in which a set of self-governing commitments that are exemplary from the perspective
of autonomy lead to morally bad results? The interesting cases will be those in which the
agent fails to do something she ought to have done, or does something she ought not to have
done, simply because the moral considerations in play never occurred to her as a result of
her self-governing commitments. Such cases will be possible even if those self-governing
commitments are morally permissible in their content, in that they display no ill will, cri-
ticizable evaluative judgments, or moral indifference. Nor need these lapses stem from
general moral ignorance or a thoroughgoing incapacity to remember or attend to moral
reasons. An agent who is generally capable of being sensitive to her moral reasons may
nevertheless fail to consider them in a given case as a result of the proper functioning of
the very structure that constitutes her as an autonomous agent.
As an example, consider Professor Plum. Plum is an autonomous, self-governing agent
par excellence. He resembles Grahm in the epigraph from Driftless, but with respect to aca-
demia: he cares deeply about his academic pursuits and identiﬁes with so caring. And he has
formed a number of self-governing policies over the years concerning which considerations
to treat as reasons. He modeled these after his professors in undergraduate and graduate
school, because he values tradition and sees himself as tasked with perpetuating a venerable
academic institution. In his view, part of the role of a professor is to be unconcerned with
bourgeois social customs, and so his policies include giving signiﬁcant weight to consider-
ations of non-interference with academic freedom and little weight to the social dynamics of
his workplace. Let us add that he has made a resolution to get a lot of writing done this
semester, and so to avoid getting mixed up in department gossip.
The normal functioning of Plum’s cares, policies, and resolutions in shaping what he
considers in deliberation lead to the following two events. First, Plum is exposed to a bit
of evidence that his colleague is behaving inappropriately to female students in the
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department. It is far from conclusive evidence, since the situations he hears about are
ambiguous, and it would require further investigation on his part to discover whether
there is genuine wrongdoing (which there is). However, it simply never crosses Plum’s
mind that he could or should take action; his policy favoring non-interference with his col-
leagues’ academic freedom and his resolution not to get involved in department gossip
prevent it from even occurring to him. The second event is that after deliberating about
how best to train his graduate students, he decides to require all of them to attend a confer-
ence that will be quite expensive for them (they will get no funding for it), and to be present
at after-hours networking events that take place in bars. Plum conceives of this simply as the
kind of good training he himself beneﬁted from, and it never occurs to him that his policy
might be seriously unjust to the students without outside ﬁnancial support who cannot
afford it and to the female students who tend to be treated very differently than male stu-
dents at these after-hours events.
Plum is not suffering from general moral ignorance, and he does not harbor negative
evaluative judgments concerning female or low-income students. If his practical thinking
and action were not so heavily guided by his self-conception as a professor and the commit-
ments and policies that structure this practical identity, he is the kind of person that would
be more attuned to the opportunities to correct social injustice that he is presented with.
Indeed, he is sensitive to this kind of moral reason in settings other than his professional
life; his behavior is not straightforwardly explicable by a general lack of concern for
doing right. Most importantly, Plum’s intentions are good, at least in the sense that the
values that structure them really are worthwhile considerations, and in that there is
nothing explicitly criticizable in their content. He is simply deaf to some of the moral fea-
tures of his situation.
The question is whether agents like Plum are morally blameworthy for what they do, or
fail to do, when the fact that they should act otherwise simply never occurred to them as a
result of their self-governing commitments. I think cases such as these pose a genuine
dilemma, and I do not aim to argue here that there is only one reasonable response.
What I do wish to argue is that if we accept a quite modest principle linking agentive
activity with responsibility, it follows from the “silencing” views of autonomy that
agents like Plum ought to be held responsible, on pain of those theories conceding that
they are not really accounts of agency at all. Some may consider this result to be a reductio
of the approach, in that it conﬂicts not only with the Searchlight View about moral respon-
sibility but also with most versions of its major competitor, Attributionism. On the other
hand, others who are friendly to the approach and thus accept the consequence will be
led to a fairly revisionary view of the conditions of moral responsibility. In what follows,
I will ﬁrst argue for the implication, and then reﬂect on the case for and against accepting
it. As I think some ambivalence is genuinely warranted here, I will ultimately leave it to the
reader to decide which horn to grasp.
The reason it follows from the Silencing View of autonomy that people like Plum
should be blamed for failing to respond to considerations that never occurred to them is
simple: these events are direct manifestations of their agency. The following principle
states a modest connection between agential activity and responsibility, and strikes me as
true: if we are morally responsible for anything in our lives, we are responsible for those
instances in which we are most active in determining ourselves. This principle is consistent
with concluding that we are not morally responsible for anything, although I will assume
here that we are. It is also consistent with supposing that responsibility extends even
further to events with respect to which we are passive, but that would be a stronger thesis
than is needed here. The weaker principle is simply meant to capture the widely-held
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thought that the most appropriate candidates for praise and blame are those things that are
up to us. And this is just what the views in question are theories of: they articulate what it is
to be active as opposed to be passive in our lives. A central insight is that agential control is
not limited to conscious control, and the self is not something that is simply passively inher-
ited. But if this is right, then there seems to be no room to withhold responsibility from
Plum; his thoughtlessness was the direct manifestation of his capacity to be a self-governing
and autonomous agent, functioning precisely as it was supposed to.4
One might worry that this argument proves too much, since we are not responsible for
all of the properties of events that are exercises of full-blooded agency under some descrip-
tion. If I intentionally put a substance in your coffee that I have every reason to believe is
sugar, the fact that the event was intentional under one description should not entail that I
am blameworthy for poisoning you with what was in fact arsenic.5 It is tempting to con-
clude that this is because the poisoning was unintentional, and infer that because the silen-
cing of certain considerations in deliberation is also unintentional, it is also excluded from
the scope of responsibility. What I am suggesting, however, is that the status of an event as
unintentional does not necessarily bar it from being a manifestation of agency, and therefore
from moral assessment. On the views in question, what intentional actions and silencing
have in common is that realizing the content of the thinker’s intentions and structuring
her deliberation are both deﬁning goals of the psychological system that constitutes her
as an agent. This system was guiding in its characteristic way when it led Plum to have
one thought too few; that the relevant considerations were ﬁltered out of deliberation
was not an accident or a byproduct of self-governance, but rather an essential part of it.
Bringing about unforeseen side effects, in contrast, is no part of the system’s deﬁning
goal and so not a direct manifestation of agency.
It is open to the Silencing View to attempt to avoid the conclusion that Plum is respon-
sible for his unwitting violations by maintaining that the notions of activity, control, and
guidance it is elucidating are different in kind from those appealed to in the above principle,
and that they are not intended to have any direct implications for deep responsibility. To
employ a distinction of GaryWatson’s (1996), perhaps these views are relevant only to attri-
butability and not to genuine accountability. This would clearly be false of Frankfurt’s
work, which is explicitly addressed to questions of moral responsibility, but I think it is con-
sistent with the dominant focus of Bratman’s and Holton’s contributions (see Holton 2010).
Nevertheless, it would be disappointing to discover that the research conducted in the phil-
osophy of action for the last few decades simply has nothing to do with the question of what
we are accountable for. On pain of being vulnerable to the accusation that we action theor-
ists have entirely changed the subject, this option ought to be avoided if possible.
Given this, let us examine the considerations bearing on whether to accept that we are
blameworthy for such unwitting failures. The ﬁrst thing to note is that this consequence
conﬂicts with the verdict of both the Searchlight View and most existing versions of its
major alternative, the Attributionist approach. The Searchlight View will not hold him
accountable because there was no point in time at which Plum chose a course of action
in the awareness of its negative moral implications, or of which such implications were
reasonably foreseeable. The fact that the relevant considerations never entered his mind
during deliberation was not the product of a process of which he was directly aware or
about which he made a conscious choice. True, there were points in time when Plum con-
sciously reﬂected on the self-governing policies and resolutions that contributed to these
moments of moral deafness.6 Only an antecedent allegiance to the Searchlight View
would justify us in insisting that these past events are the locus of blame, however. He
adopted his self-governing policies concerning the limits of his role and responsibilities
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as a professor many years ago, and although they could have been more morally admirable,
they were not impermissible in their content. Nor was it reasonable to expect him to foresee
the impact they would have on his far future deliberation (as Vargas 2005 convincingly
argues). Even more plausibly, when one comes to care about a person, career, or cause,
the fact that it may lead to future moral deafness is generally either unforeseeable or irre-
levant – we are not required to avoid caring about things just because it might have bad
consequences down the road.
The ﬁrst question is thus whether we have stronger reason to adhere to the Searchlight
View than to embrace the consequences of these views of autonomous agency. The intuition
is powerful that if Plum was never consciously aware of the moral wrongness of his choices,
or risk thereof, then his infractions were too akin to inadvertence to merit blame. If his
failure to notice the moral downside of his behavior did not express reprehensible evalua-
tive judgments about the value of other people, how is this relevantly different from inad-
vertently becoming distracted or, to use an example of Frankfurt’s, failing to suppress a burp
(2008)? But I am effectively suggesting that the Silencing View of agency offers a ready
answer to this question: unwitting violations are culpable when they are the direct result
of agential activity, whereas genuine inadvertence is passive – it is something that
happens to you. Viewed in this light, the heart of the disagreement is over whether anything
could truly count as active self-determination if conscious awareness is not involved.
But this is primarily a question for action theory, and so I suggest that the burden is now
on the Searchlight View to explain why not; mere intuitions to the contrary will not sufﬁce.
Again, the suggestion cannot simply be that conscious awareness is like a little person in the
head that does the deciding. What we have seen is that even if it is granted that intentional
action necessarily involves awareness of what one is doing, this would not sufﬁce to vin-
dicate the Searchlight View of responsibility. The assumption that we can only be held
responsible for our intentional actions and not unwitting omissions or unforeseen side
effects would beg the question in this context.
Levy (2013) has commendably taken up this burden on behalf of the Searchlight View,
arguing that awareness is essential because it is a necessary condition of expressing one’s
evaluative stance on the world through action. The ﬁrst premise in his argument is that an
agent’s values consist only in attitudes of which she is access-conscious. In support of this
claim, Levy proposes that only conscious attitudes generate the dispositional stereotype that
is associated with or constitutive of valuing, because unconscious attitudes tend not to be
informationally integrated or rule-based and thus fail to realize the normative aspects of
that dispositional proﬁle (218–221). The second step in the argument asserts that
because deliberation is itself a conscious process, only conscious beliefs are available to
form the content of our reasons for action (222–224). The conclusion is that only
actions settled on consciously in deliberation and caused by reasons of which the agent
is aware are genuine expressions of the quality of that agent’s will, and thus the only
events for which we are responsible (227). Awareness plays a double role, underwriting
the status of a set of attitudes as the agent’s values and enabling the expression of those
values through action.
For present purposes, let us simply grant Levy’s premises; according to the theories of
agency under discussion, the conclusion does not follow. In particular, let us grant that our
values, understood as the ends we treat as reason-giving, must feature consciously in delib-
eration in order to serve as the content of our reasons for acting. It does not follow that the
will is only expressed in the content of the reasons for which we act, or that only an agent’s
evaluative outlook is subject to moral assessment. Precisely what I have aimed to highlight
here is the way in which the will may be directly implicated in what we do not do, or do
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unwittingly. It might be that the cares, policies, and resolutions that constitute the will must
themselves be accessible to consciousness (though I am not convinced that this is so,
especially in the case of cares), but their agential manifestations will not always be con-
scious in nature. In the absence of further argument, then, the Searchlight View is left in
the position of begging the question against the Silencing View of agency, and so cannot
serve as the basis for rejecting the implications of the Silencing View.
So much the worse for the Searchlight View, we might think. But perhaps surprisingly,
most extant versions of the major alternative, the Attributionist View, will not deliver a
different verdict on Plum. Attributionist views deny that responsibility must be grounded
in a conscious choice that was made at some point, holding instead that an agent is respon-
sible for an event or state of affairs just in case it can correctly be attributed to her as expres-
sive of something relevant about her psychology or character. However, they tend to hold
that attitudes, omissions, failures to remember, and the like are blameworthy only insofar as
they speciﬁcally reﬂect something morally problematic about the agent’s evaluative judg-
ments or a lack of good will. On Nomy Arpaly’s (2003) view, for instance, the failure to do
what is morally required is blameworthy only if it reﬂects a lack of concern for one’s moral
reasons. Angela Smith (2005, 2008) has argued that one is morally responsible for some
event if that event is a manifestation of the fact that one’s rational judgments are in violation
of moral standards. And T. M. Scanlon has similarly claimed that an agent is blameworthy
for those things that express or reveal the presence of attitudes toward others that impair the
relations others can have with her (1998, 2008).
Attributionist views are in a good position to hold people responsible for what they fail
to notice, remember, or think of. The plausible thought is that such lapses can express the
presence of morally objectionable attitudes or the absence of moral concern even if this
expression is involuntary. But even granting that this is correct, the problem is that there
is no ﬁrm ground on which to insist that Plum must either have morally objectionable eva-
luative attitudes or lack proper moral concern. To assume that this is so is essentially to pre-
suppose that if he had had the proper concern, or had lacked some of his actual evaluative
attitudes, the relevant considerations would have occurred to him. From the perspective of
moral psychology, this presupposition would be bizarrely ad hoc: why think that even a
ﬁtting amount of moral concern necessarily overcomes the proper functioning of agential
silencing mechanisms? This is not merely an unreasonably high bar to set, but also meta-
physically inexplicable. And it is explanatorily unnecessary to posit a deﬁcient desire to do
what is right; the more obvious explanation appeals to the strength of the silencing mech-
anism. Plausibly, it must not be the case that silencing always or even frequently overrides
moral sensitivity, but an agent’s cares, policies, and resolutions may prevent her from
putting two and two together in a particular case even if her desire to do what is right gen-
erally does guide her practical thought. By hypothesis, the self-governing commitments that
led to Plum’s lapses are not themselves reﬂective of negative evaluative judgments about
women or those with meager ﬁnancial resources. To be sure, he could have made moral
sensitivity more of a priority. But I take the lesson of Susan Wolf’s (1982) repudiation of
moral sainthood as a personal ideal that Plum’s emphasis on non-moral values is
permissible.
Sher is unique (to my knowledge) in defending a morally neutral Attributionist account,
holding that the agent should be identiﬁed with “the collection of physical and psychologi-
cal states whose elements interact to sustain his characteristic patterns of conscious and
rational activity,” and held responsible for the upshots of that structure with or without
awareness (2009, 124). He does not aim to spell out in detail what this structure consists
in, but I suggest that this is precisely what contemporary action theory has been engaged
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in. There is therefore precedent for an Attributionist view that takes Plum to be blame-
worthy for his unwitting failures. It is important to emphasize, however, that Sher
himself takes this upshot to be a radical reconceptualization of the epistemic conditions
on moral responsibility. If our best theories of autonomous agency vindicate this result,
we will have learned something signiﬁcant indeed by doing action theory before ethics.
I will conclude this section by reﬂecting on whether there are independent reasons to
ﬁnd this result acceptable. In favor of holding Plum responsible, it is common to say that
he should have known. While attractive, this claim is highly puzzling. In some cases, it
is merely a way of expressing the idea that Plum has conducted himself in a way that
had negative consequences, and that it would have been better if he had known. But this
is something on which all sides can agree. In the law, it is understood as the claim that
another person – a reasonable person – would have known. It is unclear how the epistemic
status of a different person can ground Plum’s responsibility, however. Plum himself was
unaware of what he was doing, and so his decisions themselves did not entail an acceptance
of the problematic consequences even if those of his more reasonable counterpart would
have. Moreover, we cannot simply infer from the existence of this legal standard that it cap-
tures anything illuminating about the conditions of moral responsibility, for the law is con-
cerned with a variety of factors other than enforcing morality.
We might attempt to forge a connection between reasonable persons and actual persons
by claiming that in every case where a reasonable person would have known, there was
something the actual person should have done in order to have known. This is the right
thing to say in tracing cases, as when the ignorance is a result of the agent intentionally
having become intoxicated. But in most instances, there will have been no explicit
choice to render oneself incapable of attending to one’s moral reasons. We might say
instead that the reasonable person would have known because there was evidence available
from which he would have reasoned to the correct conclusion, and the actual agent could
have done the same. But while the accessibility of relevant evidence is plausible as a necess-
ary condition of responsibility, I do not think it is sufﬁcient. As Rosen (2003) points out, it
might be true that an agent could easily have arrived at the correct conclusion if he had
reﬂected, but he might also have had no special reason to suppose that further reﬂection
was called for. If we are never permitted to refrain from reﬂecting on evidence that is acces-
sible to us, then it is clear that the silencing effect of self-governing commitments will be
morally problematic – but surely such a moral obligation is too demanding for cognitively-
limited agents like us.
The most plausible justiﬁcation for holding Plum responsible is to claim that he ought to
have been more attentive and open-minded. If he were such as to consider more and various
options in deliberation, he would have come to a different and better conclusion. Barbara
Herman has argued, for instance, that maxims of sufﬁcient means must be adopted with
respect to ends that are morally required (1993, 99–101).7 In some cases, the required
means will involve ensuring that one remembers or is otherwise in a position to fulﬁll
one’s obligations. If this is right, then perhaps the correct criticism to make of Plum is
that he failed in his duty to do whatever it takes to ensure that he does not blank on impor-
tant considerations.
But this diagnosis would have radical implications for anyone sufﬁciently committed to
being morally good: we must be wary of becoming autonomous, self-governing agents,
assuming that the Silencing View is correct about what this amounts to. Doing whatever
one can to be aware of all the potentially relevant considerations and to weigh them prop-
erly in deliberation is potentially in tension with having general policies, resolutions, or
cares that may prevent one from noticing such considerations in a given case. Perhaps
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Plum ought not to have cared so deeply for carrying on tradition and focusing on his
research, or to have formed policies leading him to ignore the interpersonal dynamics of
his profession. The values to which he committed were in general permissible; this is
what makes him very different from Iago, whose self-governing commitments are explicitly
evil. But on one reading, the lesson he teaches is that in pursuing autonomy, it does not
sufﬁce from a moral point of view to act only on good intentions.
As I said at the outset, I see no easy way of answering the question of whether to blame
Plum. I will leave it to the reader to decide whether the argument is an instance of Modus
Ponens or Modus Tollens.8
4. Self-governance, morality, and rationality
I will close by reﬂecting brieﬂy on the signiﬁcance of these observations for our thinking
about the value of autonomy. Others such as Arpaly have argued that autonomy is not a
necessary condition for direct moral praise- and blameworthiness. The question of this
paper has been whether it is even sufﬁcient. If it is not, I think this would show that con-
temporary action theory has gone signiﬁcantly astray, to the point of changing the subject. If
it is, then it turns out that cultivating a set of self-governing commitments that are in them-
selves unobjectionable can lead to blameworthy deliberative inattentiveness down the road.
Enhancing agential control comes at the price of curtailing sensitivity to situations that were
unanticipated in those commitments.
This is not to say that we should not strive for self-governance, or should avoid devel-
oping a wholehearted and resolute character; there are permissible personal ideals other
than moral sainthood. However, I do think that the potential tradeoff between achieving
a resolute, self-governed, volitionally-anchored will and being sufﬁciently sensitive and
open-minded to one’s moral reasons may have important consequences. For instance, I
think it is a basis for concern about the project of grounding the normativity of rationality
in the value of self-governance, as Bratman has recently advocated in an important and fas-
cinating series of papers (2009, 2012). Bratman’s proposal is that we have a reason to
govern our own lives, and that this global reason grounds a local reason to be self-governing
at each particular opportunity in which self-governance is possible. He further argues that
satisfying the rational norms on intention – intention consistency, means-end coherence,
and an intention-stability norm he calls (D) – is a necessary constitutive means of being
self-governing. If we do not satisfy these rational norms, our practical standpoints will
be indeterminate in a way that blocks the possibility of self-governance. We therefore
have reason to be rational in each case in which self-governance is possible. The claim
is not that this reason is overriding in every case, or even especially strong; it might be
that we have better reason in some instances not to be rational. But the desired conclusion
is that absent some deep psychological defect preventing the possibility of self-governance,
there is always some reason to be practically rational.
I have elsewhere voiced doubts about whether the average concern for self-governance
is sufﬁcient to generate a reason to be self-governing at each opportunity (Paul 2014). Most
of us also value spontaneity and whimsy, such that a life of perfect self-governance would
be a failure by our own lights. But I think it is even more worrisome for this strategy that we
might have moral reason to curtail self-governance. An agent who actually availed herself
of every opportunity to be self-governing is much more likely to ﬁnd herself in the situation
of failing to think of morally relevant considerations in a given episode of deliberation. The
claim is not that being self-governing necessarily leads to moral violations; for all I have
argued, it is possible to be autonomous in a morally laudable way. But for the worry to
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arise, it sufﬁces that in pursuing a self-governed life, we can rather easily end up in a state
like Plum’s without making any particular choice with recognizably immoral content.
For an agent in this condition, her reason to be self-governing competes with her reason
to do what it takes to be moral, as well as any other conﬂicting personal ideals. This conﬂict
will be especially vivid if there is no way for her to improve morally without temporarily
undermining self-governance, as will at least sometimes be the case. Now, it is a compli-
cated matter to understand how general reasons – reason generally to be self-governing,
reason generally to be moral – compete to issue reasons for particular actions that would
promote one value but not the other. It is plausible to suppose that in some cases,
however, one’s reason to be self-governing will be completely defeated by the other
reasons in play. That is, in a given instance, one may have no normative reason at all to
pursue self-governance even if it is perfectly possible to do so.
In contrast, the normative force of the requirements of rationality does not seem subject
to being canceled out by other substantive concerns, or to wax and wane depending on what
else is at stake. If rationality is a good, it is generally thought to be a good that is indepen-
dent of one’s substantive ends. I do not pretend to have argued for this, and a more thorough
defense of these claims is beyond the scope of this paper. But I tentatively conclude that
grounding the normativity of rationality in the value of self-governance leaves rationality
on shaky ground. Exemplary self-governance can directly pave the road to hell in a way
that exemplary rationality should not.
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Notes
1. Castan˜eda (1979) eloquently articulates the phenomenon of the “acceptance” of consequences in
the context of practical deliberation:
An action that one ponders and places as a side action in a plan leading to a goal action, is
an action that one . . . accepts in spite of how painful it is, in order to attain that goal. This
deliberate toleration is of the same family as the acceptance we call intending.
2. Though of course, not by everyone; for instance, the point has been made very clearly by
Matthew Smith (2010) and Arpaly and Schroeder (2012).
3. As Ben Schwan argues in “The Reasons Intentions Give,” unpublished manuscript.
4. There are of course numerous senses of responsibility aﬂoat in the philosophical literature. My
hope here is to sidestep the complexity of this debate by focusing on a broad and untheorized
notion of responsibility, stipulating only that it must be one that grounds praise, blame, and
guilt. I think an upshot of the argument is that the burden is on those who wish to deny that
Plum is subject only to a weaker or superﬁcial sense of responsibility to explain why, given
that there is nothing lacking in his case that is obviously essential to his agency.
5. Thanks to James Shaw for raising this objection.
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6. It is this feature of the view that make it less obviously subject to Susan Wolf’s objections to
“Real Self” accounts of responsibility.
7. Thanks to Claudia Card for pointing me to this.
8. Of course, nothing I have said here rules out the possibility of supplementing the Silencing View
of autonomy with further conditions designed to bring its implications in line with what we inde-
pendently take to be true of moral responsibility. For instance, one could add a “searchlight” con-
dition on agential guidance, excluding any process of which the agent is unaware from having the
status of self-governance. But many potential modiﬁcations, including this one, will be in tension
with the foundational commitments of this approach to understanding agency and so will fall
under the “Modus Tollens” heading.
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